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Focusing on arbitral decisions on human rights claims arising in the
employment context, this paper looks at the nature of the expertise of adminis-
trative tribunals and its role in determining the standard of judicial review. The
author notes that arbitrators are considered to have expertise in labour rela-
tions, and that this has been a key factor in the high level of deference generally
shown by courts to their decisions. However, despite the expansion of arbitral
jurisdiction over human rights matters in unionized workplaces, the courts,
applying a "correctness" standard of review, have refused to grant deference to
arbitrators with respect to their interpretation and application of human rights
legislation, in part on the basis that they are not expert in the area. The author
takes issue with this view, contending that arbitrators have in fact acquired
significant expertise in interpreting human rights statutes in the context of the
employment relationship, and that recognition of such expertise should lead to
a reappraisal of the level of curial deference. In this regard, he argues, it would
be open to the courts to deem arbitrators to possess the requisite expertise in
human rights, thereby justifying a more deferential "reasonableness" standard
of review.
1. INTRODUCTION
[T]he Human Rights Commission has greater expertise than grievance arbitra-
tors in the resolution of human rights violations. In my view, any concerns
in respect of this matter are outweighed by the significant benefits associated
with the availability of an accessible and informal forum for the prompt
resolution of allegations of human rights violations in the workplace . ...
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Universit6 de Sherbrooke. A draft of this paper was
presented at the Canadian Bar Association's 12th Annual National Administrative
Law and Labour & Employment Law Conference, 25 November 2011. I would
like to thank the participants at that conference, as well as my colleagues Maxime
St-Hilaire and Genevieve Cartier for their comments and insights. The anonym-
ous reviewers and editorial staff of this journal also provided valuable comments.
I am grateful for the research assistance of Flore-Camille Tardif.
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Moreover, expertise is not static, but, rather, is something that develops as
a tribunal grapples with issues on a repeated basis. The fact that the Human
Rights Commission currently has greater expertise than the [Arbitration]
Board in respect of human rights violations is an insufficient basis on
which to conclude that a grievance arbitrator ought not to have the power
to enforce the rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code.
- lacobucci J. in Parry Sound'
When I began to work in the field of labour law - not so very
long ago - it was already well established that arbitrators had the
power to interpret and apply both the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and quasi-constitutional human rights statutes. Meiorin was
hot off the presses, and labour litigators bustled off to arbitration and
judicial review hearings armed with a "unified approach" to claims of
employment discrimination. 2 Pleading human rights claims seemed to
me to be a normal - even routine - part of labour law practice.
While taking a coffee break in the course of preparing argu-
ments for an arbitration hearing, I spoke with a senior lawyer, who
offered me some advice: "Always try to plead a Charter question," he
said, referring to the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms.
"Even if you have to scratch your head to find it." I looked at him
expectantly, happy to receive pearls of wisdom from a veteran of the
trenches going back to the days when judicial review was fraught with
questions preliminary and collateral, and ashtrays could be found on
every table in an arbitration hearing. "Plead a Charter question and
remember to plead it last," he continued. "Arbitrators hate dealing
with the complexity of the Charter and they'd rather find in your
favour on another argument so they can avoid dealing with it."
Several years later, I recounted this story to a leading member
of the Bar. "That'll only work with the older arbitrators," he com-
mented. "The younger ones are pretty up to date on Charter stuff."
He went on: "But it's still good advice. On judicial review of Charter
questions, the correctness standard applies, so it gives you another
1 Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v Ontario Public
Service Employees Union, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42 at para 53, [2003] 2
SCR 157.
2 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British
Columbia Government and Services Employees' Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at paras
50-55, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin].
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kick at the can if you don't like the outcome at arbitration. Come to
think of it, it might still be a good idea to plead it last. Arbitrators hate
to be quashed on judicial review and they might be inclined to find for
you on other grounds, so they can stay behind the protective shield of
the patently unreasonable standard."
These two anecdotes frame the issues I want to discuss in this
paper. First, some arbitrators don't (or at least didn't) have the exper-
tise to deal with human rights claims, which involve a complex and
evolving area of law. Second, arbitrators are beginning to acquire that
expertise (or have acquired it). Third, courts don't defer to arbitrators
on their interpretation of human rights legislation, as they are not
perceived to have a higher level of expertise than judges do. Finally,
the dynamic of expertise and standards of judicial review has very
concrete effects on how actors in labour law approach disputes, to the
point of strategically mobilizing those factors for short-term advan-
tage at the long-term expense of undermining the policy touchstone
of labour arbitration: speedy, accessible and informal hearings that
lead to final and binding decisions which allow parties to a collective
agreement to get on with the business of working together.
This leads to me to pose the following questions, which I address
in this paper: (1) What exactly is tribunal expertise in the context of
the law of judicial review? (2) If arbitrators can acquire expertise,
should this be reflected in the law of judicial review? (3) What are
the consequences of a judicial policy of reviewing arbitral awards on
human rights claims according to the standard of correctness? (4) Is a
more deferential approach desirable or even possible?
In Part 2, I outline how the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court of Canada, have dealt with the notion of expertise. I conclude
that the role played by administrative tribunal expertise in standard
of review analysis is far from clear, but that the most promising
approach is to deem tribunals to have expertise rather than to let judi-
cial determination of actual expertise play an independent role in the
analysis. This recognizes the importance of expertise to a general
theory of judicial review without requiring judges to embark on a
methodologically suspect extra-statutory search for evidence of it. I
then argue in Part 3 that labour arbitrators do in any event have sig-
nificant expertise in interpreting human rights statutes in the context
of the employment relationship, and that courts should therefore show
deference to their interpretations. This deference can be justified, in
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part, by applying the kind of deeming logic set out in the first part.
Finally, in Part 4, 1 address some potential objections to granting
arbitrators deference on judicial review.
2. THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE AND ITS ROLE IN
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE
Though an administrative tribunal's expertise is an important
factor in determining the applicable standard of review,3 the Supreme
Court has had little to say about exactly what expertise is, 4 and it is
not clear how it should be taken into account as an independent criter-
ion in determining the standard of review.
A small but detailed body of commentary has simultaneously
decried the paucity of the Court's analysis of tribunal expertise and
offered two helpful conceptual distinctions that can serve to guide
3 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR
748, 144 DLR (4th) 1, per lacobucci J ("Expertise ... is the most important of
the factors that a court must consider in settling on a standard of review" at para
50); see also Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] 1 SCR 982 at para 32, 160 DLR (4th) 193.
4 See Mathieu Socque, "La notion d'expertise du d6cideur administratif aux fins de
l'application de la m6thode pragmatique et fonctionnelle" (2006) 47:2 C de D 319
("surprisingly, the Supreme Court specifies that the factor of expertise is essential,
even primordial, in the determination of the level of deference that courts should
show, but the Court does not indicate, strictly speaking, what exactly tribunal
expertise is" at 330) [author's translation]; David P Jones, "Standards of Review
in Administrative Law" in Laverne A Jacobs & Justice Anne L Mactavish, eds,
Dialogue between Courts and Tribunals: Essays in Administrative Law and
Justice 2001-2007 (Montreal: Editions Th6mis, 2008) 213. ("Unfortunately,
none of the recent cases address how one determines whether a particular statu-
tory delegate has expertise with respect to the particular issue in question" at
288); Lorne Sossin, "Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of
Deference? Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law" (2003)
27 Advocate's Q 478 ("While [the jurisprudence] describes expertise, it does
not provide guidance regarding the methodology to be employed to establish
expertise" at 490); Beth Bilson, "The Expertise of Labour Arbitrators" (2005) 12
CLELJ 33 ("the Court has not to date presented a coherent - or possibly even
consistent - description of the essential features of the expertise that it would
accept as justifying deference" at 41). See also Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1182 v Saint John (City of) Pension Board, 2006 NBCA 70, 301 NBR (2d)
1 [Saint John] ("There is very little written on how one goes about assessing the
expertise of an adjudicative tribunal" at para 82).
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a coherent and realistic understanding of the role of expertise in
judicial review.
The first of these distinctions is between the expertise of indi-
vidual adjudicators and the institutional expertise of tribunals.6 An
individual adjudicator may qualify as an expert in the specialized
field that the tribunal is charged with regulating. In determining the
expertise of individual adjudicators, their credentials - including
academic training and relevant work experience - would be salient
factors.7 Alternatively, the tribunal qua institution might be character-
ized as expert.8 On this view, expertise is indicated by the tribunal's
institutional structure, including rules of appointment, mechanisms
for the continuing education of members and for the evaluation of
their decisions, and the regular holding of full board meetings where
members can share their experience and collectively reflect on juris-
prudential developments.9
5 See Laverne A Jacobs & Thomas S Kuttner, "The Expert Tribunal" in Laverne A
Jacobs & Justice Anne L Mactavish, eds, Dialogue between Courts and Tribunals:
Essays in Administrative Law and Justice 2001-2007 (Montreal: Editions
Th6mis, 2008) 67; Socque, "Notion d'expertise," supra note 4; R E Hawkins,
"Reputational Review I: Expertise, Bias and Delay" (1998) 21:1 Dal LJ 5 at 9-26;
Bilson, "Expertise of Labour Arbitrators," supra note 4. See also David J Mullan,
"Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?" (2004) 17
Can J Admin L & Prac 59 at 68-72; Jones, "Standards of Review," supra note
4 at 273-293. Note that all of these articles predate the decision in Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, in which the Supreme Court of
Canada abandoned both the terminology of the pragmatic and functional approach
to judicial review set out in Union des employes de service, Local 298 v Bibeault,
[1988] 2 SCR 1048 (available on CanLII) and Pushpanathan, supra note 3, as
well as the distinction between the standards of patent unreasonableness and rea-
sonableness simpliciter set out in Southam, supra note 3. However, expertise is
still a key factor in determining the level of deference accorded to administrative
tribunals in the standard of review analysis adopted in Dunsmuir.
6 Jones, "Standards of Review," supra note 4 at 288; Socque, "Notion d'exper-
tise," supra note 4 at 326-327.
7 Socque, ibid at 352-355; Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at
12-14.
8 This distinction has been taken up by the courts. See e.g. Nor-Man Regional
Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011
SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616 (labour arbitrators "benefit from institutional exper-
tise in resolving disputes arising under a collective agreement, even if they lack
personal expertise in matters of law" [emphasis in original] at para 53).
9 Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at 15.
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There is a certain amount of overlap in the sets of features that
go to determining the expertise of individual adjudicators and the
institutional expertise of a tribunal. For instance, a tribunal's appoint-
ment procedure (an institutional characteristic) may ensure that its
adjudicators have expertise in a particular domain (an individual char-
acteristic). 0 Furthermore, institutional expertise can be articulated in
terms of the aggregate expertise of individual tribunal members."
Finally, experience - the repeated grappling with similar questions
- can contribute both to individual and institutional expertise.12
The second helpful distinction is between a tribunal's expertise
and its specialized role in the administration of a statutory scheme
or regulatory regime." A tribunal may be specialized, in the sense
that that it has an exclusive but limited jurisdiction over a domain of
activity, without its members being experts in that domain.14
Though these distinctions are analytically important, it is diffi-
cult to see how they could be taken into account in the judicial deter-
mination of expertise in the context of standard of review analysis, as
that analysis is currently understood in the jurisprudence. Whether a
decision was rendered by an expert is an empirical question, and yet
the courts do not base their determination of expertise on evidence.'"
R.E. Hawkins explains:
10 Mullan, "Struggle for Complexity" supra note 5 at 69 (describing lacobucci J's reli-
ance in Southam, supra note 3, on the provisions for recommendation and appoint-
ment to the Competition Tribunal in determining that it is an expert tribunal).
11 Jacobs & Kuttner, "Expert Tribunal," supra note 5 at 82.
12 Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at 14-15.
13 Ibid at 11-12. Socque, "Notion d'expertise," supra note 4 at 329-338.
14 Socque, ibid at 334-335. Someone can be an expert without having specialized
knowledge. In Ryan v Law Society (New Brunswick), this was found to be the
case for members of the public appointed to a professional disciplinary com-
mittee. See Mullan, "Struggle for Complexity," supra note 5 at paras 69-70
(commenting on Ryan v Law Society (New Brunswick), [2003] 1 SCR 247 and
Pushpanathan, supra note 3).
15 Mullan, ibid ("The assessment of expertise emerging from [the jurisprudence] is an
exercise which depends on a combination of considerations, most of which involve
conjecture, not scientific inquiry by the courts" at 71); Socque, "Notion d'exper-
tise," supra note 4 ("In an impressionistic and totally subjective fashion, the judge
... forms an opinion regarding the degree of expertise that might characterize the
administrative decision maker . . . and then declares that the tribunal under review
is an expert relative to this or that question" at 327) [author's translation].
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[W]hile it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended special-
ized tasks to be performed by expert tribunals, whether the tribunal performing
the task is expert or not is an empirical matter. Legislatures do not usually
write job descriptions for tribunal members, or define in detail how they are to
be chosen, or choose them, or train them, or require them to collect precedents,
or evaluate their performance. Legislation may envisage that a specialized
tribunal will be established: the reality may be something else. 16
One response to this would be for courts to hear evidence on the actual
expertise of the adjudicator who rendered the decision under review,
or on the tribunal as an institution, or on both. Indeed, some commen-
tators have suggested this,'7 and courts have occasionally referred to
the credentials or experience of individual adjudicators in coming to
the conclusion that they are experts for the purposes of the standard
of review analysis.'" There is no reason to doubt courts' capacity to
evaluate such evidence; they often do it in determining whether a wit-
ness qualifies as an expert.' 9 However, it is unclear whether evidence
16 Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at 12-13.
17 Socque, "Notion d'expertise," supra note 4 at 348, 374-375 (arguing that admin-
istrative decision-makers ought to be required to prove their actual expertise in
judicial review proceedings); Bilson, "Expertise of Labour Arbitrators," supra
note 4 (arguing that, although there is "something disturbing" and "unpalat-
able" about tendering an adjudicator's curriculum vitae, "evidence showing the
extent of an arbitrator's adjudicative experience or the length of association with
a particular collective bargaining relationship may be legitimate indicators of
expertise" at 56).
18 See e.g. Tele-Mobile v Telecommunications Workers Union, 2002 BCSC 776
(arbitrator with extensive experience in resolving disputes between the union and
employer was an expert on their collective bargaining relationship); Canadian
Pacific Limited c Fraternite des preposes a l'entretien des voies, [2003] RJDT
649 (CA) (available on QL) (arbitrator was highly specialized because he had
been designated by the parties as the sole arbitrator for several years). Contra
Saint John, supra note 4, Robertson JA ("Certainly, one is required to look
at the tribunal's constitutive statute in search of the answer and refrain from
looking at the qualifications of individual tribunal members to decide whether
the tribunal possesses a relative expertise" at para 82); Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 ("Far from subscribing
to the view that courts should be reviewing the actual expertise of administrative
decision-makers, it is my position that this is the function of the legislature"
at para 95).
19 The parallel is drawn in Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at 10-11.
352 CDN. LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL
on the actual expertise of adjudicators is admissible, 2 0 and in my view
its admission is certainly not desirable.
My first reason for disallowing the parties from leading evi-
dence of tribunal expertise is that the procedural context of judicial
review hearings is simply "not conducive to developing and testing
evidence." 21 A related objection is that judicial review proceedings
are meant to be an exceptional form of recourse, 22 and are in tension
with the policy objectives of speed and accessibility that underlie
many regimes of administrative adjudication. Allowing parties to lead
evidence on expertise would add to the duration and complexity of
proceedings and thereby (further) undermine those policy objectives.
The most serious objection to allowing evidence of expertise to
be led in judicial review proceedings is that it would violate several
principles that are taken to be fundamental to the rule of law. How can
parties benefit from equality before the law if the deference that courts
are to show to an administrative tribunal varies with who happened to
be sitting on the panel that day? The rule of law requires that the admin-
istration of justice not be arbitrary, yet this is precisely what would be
countenanced if the standard of review were to fall and rise with the
ebb and flow of adjudicator rosters. This point is sharpened when we
consider that the metric for determining the level of deference is not the
administrative tribunal's expertise considered in isolation, but its exper-
tise relative to that of the court on the question that is subject to review.
It would stand to reason that if evidence of the adjudicator's creden-
tials and experience were taken to be relevant, so would the credentials
and experience of the particular judge sitting on review. Despite the
20 Saint John, supra note 4 at paras 82-83. See also Jones, "Standards of Review,"
supra note 4 at 288 (expressing doubts as to the admissibility of evidence relat-
ing to expertise).
21 Hawkins, "Reputational Review," supra note 5 at 13, n 33. But see e.g. Quebec
Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ c C-25, art 835.3 (oral testimony may be heard in
addition to affidavits in judicial review proceedings) [CCP].
22 See e.g. CCP, ibid, arts 834-850 (covering judicial review and the modern
equivalents of the writs of quo warranto and mandamus, which are under the
title "Certain Extraordinary Recourses").
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provocative assertions of some legal realists, 23 the legitimacy of the
courts depends on the separation between the judge qua individual and
qua actor on the legal stage. "Just as an individual must cherish dreams
and illusions, so also must his judicial institutions." 24
Individual judges vary immensely in their expertise. "[N]o law-
yer can tell his client, before a lawsuit is begun, involving that client's
legal rights, whether those rights will be judicially determined by an
excellent, a mediocre, an incompetent or an otherwise undesirable
judicial officer." 25 One need only attend at a courthouse on any given
morning and observe the hurrying of counsel to consult the day's roll,
and their looks of satisfaction or dismay when they see which judge is
assigned to their case. As pedestrian as this observation may be from
the perspective of judicial anthropology, its formal recognition as
having juridical consequences would be utterly incompatible with our
law's self-conception.
The Supreme Court of Canada has avoided this problem in
determining expertise by applying a presumption: if the legislature
has defined a specialized role for a tribunal, that tribunal' s members
are deemed experts on matters within the tribunal's jurisdiction. 26
Courts' appreciation of the extent of the tribunal's expertise may vary
with the wording of the enabling statute. The more explicit the stat-
ute is in setting out the qualifications of a tribunal's members and
the mechanisms for ensuring that their expertise is institutionalized,
the more courts should be inclined to conclude that it is an expert
tribunal. 27 But whatever the conclusion with respect to expertise, it
23 See e.g. Jerome Frank, "Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect of Legal
Thinking on the Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human Beings" (1931)
80:1 U Pa L Rev 17 at 24-25; Jerome Frank, "Are Judges Human? Part Two:
As through a Class Darkly" (1931) 80:2 U Pa L Rev 233 at 247-248 [Frank,
"Part Two"].
24 Thurman Arnold, "The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process" (1932) 45:4 Harv L Rev 617 at 618 (arguing that judges' legitimacy
depends on their ability to appear impartial in making their decisions).
25 Frank, "Part Two," supra note 23 at 240.
26 See Pushpanathan, supra note 3 at para 32; see also Hawkins, "Reputational
Review," supra note 5 at 11-12; Socque, "Notion d'expertise," supra note 4 at
327, 337, 346.
27 Southam, supra note 3 at paras 51-52; compare Canada (Deputy Minister of
National Revenue) v Mattel Canada, 2001 SCC 36 at para 29, [2001] 2 SCR 100.
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is arrived at by an exercise of statutory interpretation and not by the
evaluation of evidence.2 8
In British Columbia, this approach has been codified in the
Administrative Tribunals Act: "If the tribunal's enabling Act con-
tains a privative clause, relative to the courts the tribunal must be
considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over
which it has exclusive jurisdiction." 29 This bald statutory conflation
of expertise and jurisdiction may share a serious flaw with the deem-
ing approach to expertise apparently adopted by the Supreme Court:
vacuity. If expertise is determined by reference to the specialized role
of the tribunal and the existence of a privative clause, then it would
appear to have no independent role to play in the standard of review
analysis, since those two factors are already supposed to have been
taken into account.
Recall that expertise is only one of the four factors to consider
in determining the level of deference that courts ought to show
toward administrative tribunals. The other factors are the existence
of a privative clause, the purpose of the statute, and the nature of the
question.3 0 From the outset, it was understood that the purpose of
the statute was intimately tied to the question of expertise; indeed,
"purpose and expertise often overlap."3' But if both examination of
the privative clause and the "purpose of the statute" analysis are used
in determining expertise, then it is unclear how expertise can be a
28 See Jones, "Standards of Review," supra note 4 ("it is very easy to be so blinded
by the gleam of 'expertise' that one forgets that the whole purpose of the prag-
matic and functional approach from Pushpanathan is to determine the intent of
Parliament" at 289).
29 Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c 45 [B.C. ATA], s 58(1). See also
a discussion on the effect of the privative clause in the old BC Labour Code,
RSBC 1979, c 212, s 33, in Harry W Arthurs, "Protection against Judicial
Review," in Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Judicial Review
of Administrative Rulings (Montreal, Que: Yvon Blais, 1983) 149 at 152-153
[Arthurs, "Judicial Review"]. The Supreme Court of Canada has applied the B.C.
ATA. See British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011
SCC 52, [2011] 3 SCR 422; Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC
61. However, these two decisions fail to address the conflict between the B.C.
ATA and the Court's approach to judicial review set out in Dunsmuir.
30 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 64; Pushpanathan, supra note 3.
31 Pushpanathan, supra note 3 atpara 36; see also Southam, supra note 3 atpara 50.
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separate category. One could reply that the factors "must be taken
together,"' 2 and that deciding on the standard of review "is not a
mechanical exercise" but is "necessarily flexible, and proceeds by
principled analysis rather than categories, seeking the polar star of
legislative intent."33 This does not resolve the problem, but merely
restates it. Expertise should either be taken into account or should not
be. But it makes no sense to claim both that expertise is a factor in
determining the standard of review and that expertise is only ascer-
tained by analyzing other factors.
For all the supposed clarity that was brought to the law of
judicial review by the Supreme Court's decision in Dunsmuir,3 4 the
method that the Court applied in determining expertise remains a
mystery. The majority in Dunsmuir summed up as follows the notion
of deference that underlies the reasonableness standard of review:
In short, deference requires respect for the legislative choices to leave some
matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, for the processes and
determinations that draw on particular expertise and experiences, and for the
different roles of the courts and administrative bodies within the Canadian
constitutional system.3 5
Despite the shift in language and the reduction in the number of avail-
able standards of review, the majority in Dunsmuir proposed that the
appropriate level of deference be determined by using the familiar
Pushpanathan factors, including expertise.3 6
Two years later, in Khosa,3 7 Justice Rothstein identified the
problem of the unclear relationship between expertise and the legis-
lative grant of jurisdiction backed by a privative clause. In his con-
curring opinion, he described the law of judicial review as having
two sources: interpretation of the enabling statute and in particular
32 Pushpanathan, supra note 3 at para 38.
33 Canadian Union of Public Employees and Service Employees International
Union v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para 149, [2003] 1
SCR 539.
34 Dunsmuir, supra note 5.
35 Ibid at para 49.
36 Ibid at para 64.
37 Supra note 18 at paras 74-75.
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its privative clause, and a "common law"38 of judicial review derived
from basic principles of the rule of law and informed by section 96
of the Constitution.3 9 Justice Rothstein decried the conceptual con-
fusion that arises from conflating these two sources. In particular,
he argued that the "common law" of judicial review ought not to
have introduced expertise as a free-standing basis for deference. 4 0
Rather, expertise should only be understood as a ground for deference
insofar as it is "signalled" by the legislature's enactment of a strong
privative clause:
Far from subscribing to the view that courts should be reviewing the
actual expertise of administrative decision makers, it is my position that this is
the function of the legislature. In my view, the discordance between imputed
versus actual expertise is simply one manifestation of the larger conceptual
unhinging of tribunal expertise from the privative clause. The legislatures that
create administrative decision makers are better able to consider the relative
qualifications, specialization and day-to-day workings of tribunals, boards
and other decision makers which they themselves have constituted. Where the
legislature believes that an administrative decision maker possesses superior
expertise on questions that are normally within the traditional bailiwick of
courts (law, jurisdiction, fraud, natural justice, etc.), it can express this by
enacting a privative clause. 4 1
Though there is certainly room to criticize Justice Rothstein's
opinion (on the basis, for instance, that it unduly restricts the grounds
38 Use of this term is problematic, given that it refers to the general public law of
Canada rather than the jurisprudence-based private law in force in provinces
outside of Quebec. The majority occasionally uses the more suitable expression
"general law of judicial review" (see Khosa, supra note 18 at para 33).
39 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 96, reprinted in RSC 1985, App
II, No 5. The emergence of a general law of judicial review that interacts with
the statutory interpretation of privative clauses can be traced back to Crevier v
Quebec (AG), [1981] 2 SCR 220 at para 19, 127 DLR (3d) 1 (total insulation
from judicial review is unconstitutional because it would result in the creation
of a s 96 court). Harry Arthurs described Crevier as "an illogical, a-historical,
unnecessary and unwise extension of the authorities on section 96." Arthurs,
"Judicial Review," supra note 29 at 154.
40 The turning point was Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers),
[1994] 2 SCR 557, 114 DLR (4th) 385, where the Court showed deference to the
B.C. Securities Commission on the grounds of its expertise, despite the absence
of a privative clause and the existence of a statutory right of appeal. Khosa, supra
note 18 at paras 87-92.
41 Khosa, ibid at para 95.
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on which courts can review administrative decisions,4 2 or fails to rec-
ognize that privative clauses may address issues unrelated to exper-
tise, such as expediency and cost), it has the advantage of adding
conceptual clarity. The deeming logic of expertise determination
mobilized more or less implicitly in the Supreme Court's previous
decisions is set out clearly and unapologetically. Justice Rothstein's
approach avoids the problem of how courts are to determine exper-
tise empirically, and reduces the confusion surrounding the role
of expertise in determining the level of deference that should be
afforded to administrative tribunals. It is likely for these reasons that
his approach was recently endorsed by the majority of the Court in
Rogers Communications.43
In the following section, I argue that the same deeming logic
can be applied to ground a finding that labour arbitrators are suffi-
ciently expert in human rights law in the employment context to merit
deference from the courts on judicial review.
3. THE EXPERTISE OF LABOUR ARBITRATORS
Labour relations has long been a paradigmatic example of a
domain in which courts have imputed a high level of expertise to
administrative tribunals. Many of the key moments in the evolution of
the law of judicial review have occurred in matters where a party was
seeking judicial review of a decision rendered by a labour relations
42 David Elliott argues that Rothstein J's view is internally incoherent insofar as
he makes assumptions about expertise when he advocates deference to deter-
minations of fact and the exercise of discretion, regardless of the wording of
the privative clause, and then criticizes the majority for making assumptions
about expertise when determining the standard of review on questions of law.
David Elliott, "Khosa - Still Searching for the Star" (2009) 33:2 Man LJ 211
at 224-226.
43 Rogers Communications v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers
of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, 347 DLR (4th) 235 [Rogers Communications] ("By
setting up a specialized tribunal to determine certain issues the legislature is
presumed to have recognized superior expertise in that body in respect of issues
arising under its home statute or a closely related statute, warranting judicial
review for reasonableness" at para 11).
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board or a labour arbitrator. 4 4 Generally, the purported expertise of
labour tribunals, combined with the tendency for legislatures to pro-
tect them by strong privative clauses, has resulted in a high level of
judicial deference toward their decisions.45
Judicial deference to expertise of labour tribunals is grounded
in the recognition that labour relations is a complex field involving
institutional litigants whose interests must be carefully balanced. The
ideal of industrial peace that animates the model of labour relations
inspired by the Wagner Act depends on buy-in by both unions and
employers to maintain its legitimacy. Consequently, the adjudica-
tive functions of labour tribunals are necessarily related to their
policy-making functions. 4 6 As is consistent with this coupling of
expertise and policy-making function, the Supreme Court has dis-
tinguished between arbitrators and labour boards, claiming that the
former fall "towards the lower end of the spectrum of those admin-
istrative tribunals charged with policy deliberations" when their role
is compared to "the wide-ranging policy-making function sometimes
44 See e.g. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick
Liquor Corp, [1979] 2 SCR 227 at 235, 97 DLR (3d) 417 (establishing the need
for judicial deference); Bibeault, supra note 5 at paras 122-127 (setting out the
"pragmatic and functional" approach); Dayco (Canada) Ltd v CAW - Canada,
[1993] 2 SCR 230 at para 29, 13 OR (3d) 164 (arbitration award must be correct,
and not just reasonable, when the question is one of "jurisdiction stricto sensu");
Voice Construction v Construction & General Workers' Union, Local 92, 2004
SCC 23 at para 40, [2004] 1 SCR 609 (in the absence of a privative clause, exper-
tise justifies the standard of reasonableness simpliciter); Dunsmuir, supra note 5
at para 134 (abandoning the three standards of review in favour of an analysis
of deference). For overviews of the role of labour law in the development of
administrative law jurisprudence, see Justice Stephen Goudge, "Punching Above
Its Weight: The Influence of Labour Law on the Canadian Legal System" (2005)
12 CLELJ 111; David J Mullan, "Labour Law and Administrative Law: Still the
Tail that Wags the Dog?" (2005) 12 CLELJ 213.
45 In Dunsmuir, both the majority opinion and Binnie J's concurring opinion
cited labour relations law as an example of a complex regulatory regime where
the expertise of administrative decision-makers ought to be shown deference.
Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at paras 68, 156.
46 IWA v Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd, [1990] 1 SCR 282 at para 37, 68
DLR (4th) 524.
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delegated to labour boards . . . ."47 Nevertheless, arbitrators are rou-
tinely characterized by the Court as experts in the field of labour
relations. 48
Following the framework set out in Pushpanathan and refined
in Dunsmuir, the level of deference shown to arbitrators' expertise
depends, in part, on the nature of the question under review. In par-
ticular, the Court has held that arbitrators are not experts in human
rights law. It is to this question that we now turn.
(a) Arbitrators' Jurisdiction over Human Rights Claims
Has Been Expanding in Recognition of Their Expertise
The story of the gradual recognition of the jurisdiction of arbi-
trators over claims based on human rights statutes is well known, 49
and I will offer only a brief overview.
The Supreme Court took the first step in 1975 in McLeod v.
Egan.0 In that case, the Court recognized that in the exercise of their
47 Dayco, supra note 44 at para 35, per La Forest J. See also United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v Bradco Construction Ltd,
[1993] 2 SCR 316 at 631-632, 102 DLR (4th) 402, per Sopinka J.
48 See e.g. Blanchard v Control Data Canada Ltd, [1984] 2 SCR 476, 14 DLR (4th)
289; Toronto (City) Board of Education v Ontario Secondary School Teachers'
Federation, District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487, 144 DLR (4th) 385; Battlefords and
District Co-operatives Ltd v Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
Local 544, [1998] 1 SCR 1118, 160 DLR (4th) 29; Canada Safeway Ltd v Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 454, [1998] 1 SCR 1079, 160
DLR (4th) 1; Toronto (City of) v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
79, [2003] 3 SCR 77, 232 DLR (4th) 385 [City of Toronto]; Dunsmuir, supra
note 5; Nor-Man, supra note 8.
49 For more detailed expositions of this evolution, see Karl Tabbakh, "The Standard
of Review of Grievance Arbitrators When Deciding on Human Rights Issues:
The 'Magnificent Goal' vs. 'Industrial Peace' " (1998) 43 McGill LJ 261; Donald
A MacIntosh, "The Charter and the Authority of Administrative Tribunals to
Consider Constitutional Issues" (2005) 30 Advocates' Q 344; Beth Bilson, "The
Voice from the Trenches: Administrative Tribunals and the Interpretation of the
Charter" (2006) 69 Sask L Rev 3; Gerard Notebaert, "Faut-il reformer le systeme
de l'arbitrage de griefs au Quebec?" (2008) 53 McGill LJ 103; Gilles Trudeau,
"L'arbitrage des griefs au Canada: plaidoyer pour une reforme devenue n6ces-
saire" (2005) 84 R du B 249.
50 McLeod v Egan, [1975] 1 SCR 517,46 DLR (3d) 150 (sub nom McLeod, Re).
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jurisdiction over grievances - that is, disputes over the interpretation
or application of a collective agreement" - arbitrators could deter-
mine whether the provisions of the agreement were in conformity
with mandatory employment standards legislation. Insofar as a pro-
vision did not respect minimum employment standards, the arbitrator
could refuse to give effect to it.
Legislators responded to McLeod by making explicit the power
of arbitrators to (in the words of the Quebec Labour Code) "inter-
pret and apply any Act or regulation to the extent necessary to settle
a grievance."5 2 It was therefore not surprising that parties began to
invoke the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms53 in labour
arbitration proceedings. Arbitrators' jurisdiction to entertain such
claims, and to refuse to apply statutes or collective agreements that
did not conform to the Charter, was confirmed by the Supreme Court
in Douglas College.5 4
Arbitrators' jurisdiction was further expanded to include the
power not only to interpret and apply collective agreements in con-
formity with human rights legislation but to apply that legislation
directly, even in the absence of a specific clause in the collective
agreement. In Weber, arbitral jurisdiction was found to extend to
any dispute that "in its essential character, arises from the interpret-
ation, application, administration or violation of the collective agree-
ment";" "essential character" was to be determined "on the basis
of the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties, not on the
51 This is the core jurisdiction of labour arbitrators across all Canadian jurisdictions.
See e.g. Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, ss 57-60; Labour Code, RSQ c
C-27, ss 1(f), 100-112; Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A,
ss 48-50.
52 Quebec Labour Code, ibid, s 100.12 (a).
53 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
54 Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR 570
(sub nom Douglas College v Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association) 77 DLR
(4th) 94 [Douglas College]. This was one of three decisions where the Supreme
Court found that administrative tribunals have jurisdiction to apply the Charter.
See also Cuddy Chicks Ltd v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 SCR 5,
81 DLR (4th) 121; Tetreault-Gadoury v Canada (Employment and Immigration
Commission), [1991] 2 SCR 22, 81 DLR (4th) 358.
55 Weber v Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929 at para 52, 125 DLR (4th) 583.
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basis of the legal issues which may be framed."5 6 The Court in Weber
also said that the arbitrator's jurisdiction over such disputes was
exclusive, a position that was later nuanced to allow for concurrent
jurisdiction between human rights tribunals and arbitrators in some
circumstances.17
Finally, in Parry Sound, the Supreme Court, following the rea-
soning in McLeod, came to the conclusion that a board of arbitration
has jurisdiction over human rights claims, even where the applicable
collective agreement explicitly precludes grievances based on dis-
crimination on a statutorily prohibited ground. Justice lacobucci, for
the majority, held that the arbitrator's jurisdiction over human rights
claims was grounded in the implicit incorporation of the provisions of
human rights statutes into all collective agreements.58
One of the reasons given in the cases for recognizing arbitrators'
jurisdiction over human rights claims is that their expertise is import-
ant in interpreting and applying human rights legislation, including
the Charter, in the particular context of employment. Those reasons
are thus based not only on statutory interpretation (i.e., on the hold-
ing that when labour relations statutes gave arbitrators the power to
intepret statutes, they meant to include constitutional and quasi-con-
stitutional statutes) 59 and on principle (i.e., that arbitrators cannot
56 Ibid at para 43.
57 Ibid at 72.The possibility that human rights commissions might have concur-
rent jurisdiction over human rights claims arising in a unionized workplace had
already been raised, but the Court declined to answer it at that time. Parry Sound,
supra note 1 at para 15. The Court eventually confirmed that human rights com-
missions and grievance arbitrators enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over at least
some human rights claims. See Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne
et des droits de lajeunesse) v Quebec (AG), 2004 SCC 39 at para 19, [2004] 2
SCR 185 [Morin]. Appeal courts in provinces other than Quebec have followed
Morin. See e.g. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 583 v Calgary (City of),
2007 ABCA 121, 404 AR 102; Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia
(Human Rights Commission), 2008 NSCA 21, 290 DLR (4th) 577.
58 Supra note 1 at para 28. However, the Court has adopted a different view in
situations where statutory requirements are found to be incompatible with the
collective bargaining relationship, holding that such requirements are not incor-
porated into collective agreements. See Isidore Garon Ltee v Tremblay; Fillion
et Freres (1976) v Syndicat national des employes de garage du Quebec, 2006
SCC 2, [2006] 1 SCR 27.
59 Douglas College, supra note 54 at paras 75-79.
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refuse to give effect to fundamental rights),60 but also on practical
considerations. For instance, in Douglas College, Justice La Forest
explained:
There are, as well, clear advantages for the decision-making process in
allowing the simple, speedy, and inexpensive processes of arbitration and
administrative agencies to sift the facts and compile a record for the benefit of
a reviewing court. It is important, in this as in other issues, to have the advan-
tage of the expertise of the arbitrator or agency. That specialized competence
can be of invaluable assistance in constitutional interpretation. 61
Justice lacobucci adopted a similar line of reasoning in Parry Sound:
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, the prompt, final and binding reso-
lution of workplace disputes is of fundamental importance, both to the par-
ties and to society as a whole . . . . It is essential that there exist a means of
providing speedy decisions by experts in the field who are sensitive to the
workplace environment, and which can be considered by both sides to be final
and binding. 62
This overview of the expansion of labour arbitrators' jurisdic-
tion shows how they came to have the power to interpret and apply
human rights statutes, including the Canadian Charter, and that judi-
cial recognition of this power was predicated in part on an assess-
ment of arbitrators' expertise. Nonetheless, the same jurisprudence
that recognized arbitrators' jurisdiction over human rights claims
also limited any deference that might be shown toward arbitrators
upon judicial review of their decisions on such claims. As we will
see in the next section, courts have generally held that no deference is
owed to arbitrators with regard to their interpretation of human rights
legislation, in spite of the courts' recognition of arbitral expertise in
employment-related matters.
60 Cuddy Chicks, supra note 54 at para 19. The tribunal in question was a labour
relations board, but the ruling also applies to labour arbitrators.
61 Supra note 54 at 92. However, the Court eventually de-emphasized these "prac-
tical considerations," holding that they could not override clear statutory lan-
guage depriving a tribunal of the power to decide questions of law. See Nova
Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers'
Compensation Board) v Laseur, 2003 SCC 54 at paras 32, 41, 56, [2003] 2
SCR 504.
62 Parry Sound, supra note 1 at para 50.
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(b) Judicial Review of Arbitral Application of Human Rights
Law: Not So Much Respect for Expertise
Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that judges of
superior courts in the provinces are to be federally appointed. It has
long been held to restrict provincial legislatures from conferring on
provincially appointed administrative tribunals powers analogous to
those exercised by superior courts. Even before the Canadian Charter
came into force, the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 96
precluded even the strongest statutory privative clauses from shel-
tering decisions of administrative tribunals from judicial review. 63
After the advent of the Charter, the same concern arose with respect to
administrative tribunal decisions that might have the effect of striking
down legislation for non-compliance with the Charter. That concern
was dealt with in these terms by Justice La Forest in Cuddy Chicks:
It must be emphasized that the process of Charter decision making is not con-
fined to abstract ruminations on constitutional theory. In the case of Charter
matters which arise in a particular regulatory context, the ability of the deci-
sion maker to analyze competing policy concerns is critical. Therefore, while
Board members need not have formal legal training, it remains that they have
a very meaningful role to play in the resolution of constitutional issues. The
informed view of the Board, as manifested in a sensitivity to relevant facts and
an ability to compile a cogent record, is also of invaluable assistance.
That having been said, the jurisdiction of the Board is limited in at least
one crucial respect: it can expect no curial deference with respect to constitu-
tional decisions.
At the end of the day, the legal process will be better served where the Board
makes an initial determination of the jurisdictional issue arising from a consti-
tutional challenge.64
63 See Crevier, supra note 39 at para 19; Quebec (AG) v Farrah, [1978] 2 SCR 638
at paras 11-13, 34 (sub nom Farrah v Quebec (AG)), 86 DLR (3d) 161.
64 Supra note 54 at paras 16-17, 19.
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Thus, the recognition of administrative tribunals' jurisdiction
over constitutional claims was from the outset accompanied by an
assertion of judicial supremacy: the standard of review was to be
that of correctness. Indeed, one of the policy reasons cited in both
Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks for recognizing the jurisdiction
of administrative tribunals over Charter claims is that they can make
"initial" determinations and compile a record of the facts that will
be useful to reviewing courts. The unstated assumption here is that
constitutional determinations are bound to be reviewed by a superior
court, which leaves the distinct impression that administrative tri-
bunals are seen as mere "fact-sifters," who decide what happened
before the ordinary courts do the real job of legal analysis. As a col-
league of mine - a professor of constitutional law - has put it:
"Administrative tribunals are certainly free to give their opinions on
constitutional law, but they do so at their own risk since it will always
be the courts who decide." 65
After a period of uncertainty, 66 the denial of curial deference
to arbitrators on constitutional issues was expanded to cover the
application of quasi-constitutional statutes such as human rights
legislation and the Quebec Charter.67 It became trite law that arbitral
interpretations of human rights statutes did not attract deference upon
65 Maxime St-Hilaire, personal communication (13 November 2010).
66 See Tabbakh, supra note 49 ("in the absence of clear legislative intervention, the
level of curial deference toward grievance arbitrators, particularly when address-
ing human rights questions, remains uncertain" at 268).
67 See e.g. Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, [1993] 1 SCR 554, 100 DLR
(4th) 658 (the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has no more expertise than
the courts in interpreting human rights legislation or other general questions of
law); Parry Sound, supra note 1 at paras 21 and 22 ("Determining whether the
substantive rights and obligations of an external statute are incorporated into a
collective agreement is a legal question of broad applicability that does not fall
within an arbitrator's core area of expertise. Although the Board has the power
to determine whether the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights
Code are incorporated into the collective agreement, the Court has the power to
interfere if the Board resolved the issue incorrectly").
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review. 68 The justification mobilized by the Supreme Court for apply-
ing the correctness standard to decisions rendered by administrative
tribunals on human rights claims is that they involve fundamental
legal questions of central importance to the legal system as a whole. 69
Since these are precisely the kind of questions in which judges are
supposed to be experts, the weighing of relative expertise will not
favour the administrative tribunal.
68 See e.g. McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v Syndicat
des employes de l'Hopital general de Montreal, 2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 SCR 161
(correctness standard applied, with no discussion of the standard of review);
Syndicat des employes de l'Hopital General de Montreal c Centre universitaire
de sante McGill, 2005 QCCA 277 at para 23 (the Court of Appeal spent a sin-
gle paragraph determining that the correctness standard applied, reversing the
Superior Court's earlier finding); Syndicat des employes de l'Hopital General de
Montreal c Sexton, JE 2004-1617 (available on QL) (the Superior Court applied
the patently unreasonable standard). See also Hydro-Quebec v Syndicat des
employees de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d'Hydro-Quebec, section
locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 43, [2008] 2 SCR 561 [Hydro-Quebec]
(correctness standard implicitly applied, with no discussion of the standard of
review); Syndicat des employees et employes de techniques professionnelles et
de bureau d'Hydro-Quebec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) c Hydro-Quebec,
2006 QCCA 150 at para 53, [2006] RJQ 426 (as in McGill, the Court of Appeal
devoted a single paragraph to the subject in determining the standard of review to
be correctness, on the ground that the arbitrator interpreted the Quebec Charter).
But see Commission des ecoles catholiques de Quebec c Gobeil, [1999] RJQ
1883 at para 34 (an arbitrator's interpretation of the Quebec Charter could be
shown deference if it did not play a "preponderant role" in the outcome).
69 See City of Toronto, supra note 48, LeBel J concurring ("constitutional and
human rights questions and those involving civil liberties, as well as other ques-
tions that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole . . . typ-
ically fall to be decided on a correctness standard" at para 67); Dunsmuir, supra
note 5 ("courts must also continue to substitute their own view of the correct
answer where the question at issue is one of general law 'that is both of central
importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's special-
ized area of expertise' " at para 60). But see Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission) v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 [Mowat] at paras
22-27 (not all general questions of law entrusted to the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal are of central importance to the legal system); Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at paras 166-168 (application of
human rights statute in accordance with established precedent and within the
expertise of the tribunal does not involve a question of law that is of central
importance to the legal system).
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There is, however, still a difference between "fundamental legal
questions" and constitutional ones: while decisions on constitutional
questions are always to be reviewed on the correctness standard
(because of the "unique role of section 96 courts as interpreters of the
Constitution"70), "fundamental legal questions" must be both "of cen-
tral importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudi-
cator's specialized area of expertise"7' for the correctness standard to
apply. This raises the question of whether it is possible for grievance
arbitrators to be considered experts on human rights claims that arise
in the employment context. In particular, we can ask whether arbitra-
tors might acquire such expertise, as the Supreme Court claimed they
could in Parry Sound.72
(c) Arbitrators' Expertise in Human Rights Claims in the
Employment Context Should Result in the Application of
the Reasonableness Standard
In Parry Sound, Justice lacobucci stated that grievance arbitra-
tors are experts in the field of labour relations but have less expertise
than human rights commissions in respect of human rights violations.
He went on to claim that expertise is not static, and to imply that over
time, arbitrators will develop expertise equivalent to that of human
rights commissions in such matters. 73 Admittedly, these arguments
were made in relation to jurisdiction and not to the standard of review,
but they do raise the possibility that arbitrators might acquire sufficient
expertise in human rights matters to justify curial deference to their
decisions. This raises the further question of exactly how courts should
go about determining whether and when sufficient expertise has been
acquired, especially given my claim that the courts' determination of
expertise is essentially grounded in their interpretation of enabling
statutes rather than in an empirical analysis of actual expertise.
It could be argued that even if arbitrators were to acquire a level
of expertise in human rights matters comparable to that of human
70 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 58.
71 Ibid at para 60, citing City of Toronto, supra note 48 (per LeBel J, emphasis
added); see also Nor-Man, supra note 8 at para 35.
72 Supra note 1 at para 53.
73 Ibid.
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rights commissions, this would not in itself justify curial deference
to their interpretation of human rights statutes, because human rights
commissions themselves are not afforded such deference. 7 4 However,
this argument fails to take into account that in deciding that human
rights commissions do not have expertise on questions of law, the
Supreme Court contrasted them with labour boards and arbitrators,
which do have such expertise. For instance, in Mossop, Justice La
Forest provided the following analysis:
[A] human rights tribunal does not appear to me to call for the same level of
deference as a labour arbitrator. A labour arbitrator operates, under legislation,
in a narrowly restricted field, and is selected by the parties to arbitrate a differ-
ence between them under a collective agreement the parties have voluntarily
entered. As well, the arbitrator's jurisdiction under the statute extends to the
determination of whether a matter is arbitrable. This is entirely different from
the situation of a human rights tribunal, whose decision is imposed on the
parties and has direct influence on society at large in relation to basic social
values. The superior expertise of a human rights tribunal relates to fact-finding
and adjudication in a human rights context. It does not extend to general ques-
tions of law such as the one at issue in this case.
74 Dickason v University of Alberta, [1992] 2 SCR 1103, 95 DLR (4th) 439;
Mossop, supra note 67; Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 SCR 571,
133 DLR (4th) 449; Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, [1996] 1 SCR
825, 171 NBR (2d) 321; Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [ 1996]
3 SCR 854, 140 DLR (4th) 193. There is a trend towards granting deference to
human rights tribunals, though not when they make determinations of law that
are of central importance to the legal system as a whole. See Mowat, supra note
69 (human rights tribunal's interpretation of jurisdiction to award costs reviewed
on standard of reasonableness, since costs are not of central importance to the
legal system as a whole). See also Figliola, supra note 29 (deference shown
to a human rights tribunal's exercise of a discretionary power, even though the
discretion required it to engage in statutory interpretation); Halifax (Regional
Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012]
1 SCR 364 (deference shown to a human rights commission's decision to refer a
complaint to a board of inquiry).
75 Mossop, supra note 67 at para 45 (La Forest J's opinion in Mossop was a con-
curring one, but the majority explicitly endorsed his reasoning on the standard of
review). See also Cooper, supra note 74 at para 61; Ross, supra note 74 at para
24. In so far as La Forest J's phrase "questions of this kind" refers to substantive
human rights law (such as the scope of "family status" protection at issue in
Mossop) rather than general statutory interpretation that is not of central import-
ance to the legal system, I submit that this passage still represents the view of the
Supreme Court of Canada. See Mowat, supra note 69 at paras 20-27.
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Certainly, this view of labour arbitration in Mossop is one
of an essentially consensual form of private ordering, concerned
primarily (or perhaps exclusively) with the application of collect-
ive agreements. This is not surprising, since Mossop was rendered
before Weber and long before Parry Sound.7 6 Nevertheless, there is
something to be said for the distinction that Justice La Forest made
in the above passage. Whether they are interpreting the "bread and
butter" terms of a collective agreement, such as seniority clauses,
overtime provisions and workplace discipline, or statutory provisions
on human rights, employment standards and the like, arbitrators are
experts in the milieu of employment - in what Justice La Forest
termed "a narrowly restricted field." In this respect, they are different
from human rights tribunals, which apply human rights statutes in a
multitude of contexts. Indeed, given the broad jurisdiction of human
rights tribunals, perhaps the only thing that can be said to be common
to the multiple contexts in relation to which they render decisions is
that all of those contexts give rise to human rights claims. Any legal
expertise that the tribunals might have is thus necessarily limited to
the interpretation of human rights statutes - and, following Justice
La Forest's reasoning, that is precisely the domain in which courts
are considered to be experts. Thus, even if the courts were to recog-
nize arbitrators' expertise in interpreting human rights statutes in the
employment context, this would not undermine the courts' claim to
supremacy in the field of general statutory interpretation.
To be clear, I am not arguing that human rights tribunals do
not deserve deference when interpreting those provisions in human
rights statutes that are of central importance to the legal system as
a whole. Perhaps they should be afforded such deference. Indeed,
perhaps they should be afforded it in the employment context, which
forms an important part of their caseload. But this is quite beside the
point. What I am arguing is that the refusal of the jurisprudence as
it now stands to show deference to human rights tribunals is not a
good reason for refusing to defer to labour arbitrators on similar ques-
tions. In any event, in determining the appropriate standard of review,
76 Note, however, that Cooper, supra note 74, and Ross, supra note 74, confirmed
the distinction between arbitral expertise and human rights commission exper-
tise. These decisions were rendered after the Supreme Court had determined that
arbitrators had the jurisdiction to apply human rights legislation.
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arbitral expertise in human rights matters should first and foremost be
understood in relation to the expertise of the reviewing court, and not
to that of human rights tribunals.77
When we consider the complexity of unionized work environ-
ments, it becomes apparent that arbitrators may have more expertise
than the courts in interpreting human rights statutes in the employ-
ment context. Consider a situation in which an arbitrator must
determine whether an employee who is the subject of prima facie dis-
crimination can be accommodated without imposing undue hardship.
In many workplaces there is more than one bargaining unit, each with
its own collective agreement. Accommodating the employee might
require her to be transferred into a position in another bargaining unit.
This in turn would require establishing her seniority in the new unit,
which could affect other workers, perhaps resulting in a layoff. Many
parties might suffer some hardship, at least two collective agreements
would have to be analyzed, and the consequences for the ongoing
working relationship between the union(s) and the employer might
be significant.78 Even though the issue in this case could easily be
framed as a purely legal question, 7 9 deciding such a matter needs an
in-depth understanding of labour relations. In this sort of case, an
arbitrator is better situated than a judge to interpret the governing
human rights legislation.s0
77 Indeed, expertise is not determinative in tracing the jurisdictional boundaries
between these two tribunals. See Parry Sound, supra note 1 at 54; Morin, supra
note 57 at para 72, Bastarache J dissenting.
78 The complex interaction between accommodation claims and seniority is dis-
cussed in Christian Brunelle, Discrimination et obligation d'accommodement en
milieu de travail syndique (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2001) at 317-346.
79 See McGill, supra note 68; Hydro-Quebec, supra note 68 (involving determin-
ations of whether the duty to accommodate has been met). On the difficulty in
determining whether a question is one of law or one of mixed law and fact, see
Bilson, "Expertise of Labour Arbitrators," supra note 4 at 54 ("In [reasonable
accommodation cases] the separation between the legal and the factual, and
between legal questions that lie at the heart of an arbitrator's mandate and those
that do not, are not straightforward matters").
80 See Council of Canadians with Disabilities v VIA Rail Canada, 2007 SCC 15
at paras 96-97, [2007] 1 SCR 650 (decisions of administrative agencies are not
reviewable on a correctness standard simply because they include a "human
rights aspect").
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Extending the judicial appreciation of arbitrators' expertise to
human rights claims would recognize that interpreting human rights
statutes in the employment context is now a core part of the arbi-
tral function. In the City of Toronto case," Justice LeBel advanced
the proposition that acquired expertise can ground judicial deference
towards administrative decisions on general questions of law. Though
he did not use the terminology of "fundamental legal questions of
central importance to the legal system as a whole," Justice LeBel
did suggest that arbitrators' decisions on general questions of law
ought to be shown deference if they are "closely connected" to the
"core" jurisdiction with respect to which they have a high level of
expertise. 82
This is similar to the position advanced in Dunsmuir in a
separate concurring opinion by Justice Binnie, who suggested that
deference should be shown toward an administrative tribunal's inter-
pretation not only of its enabling statute, but also of "closely related"
statutes. Justice Binnie said: "It should be sufficient to frame a rule
exempting from the correctness standard the provisions of the home
statute and closely related statutes which require the expertise of the
administrative decision maker (as in the labour board example)."83
Another advantage of applying the reasonableness standard
rather than the correctness standard to arbitrators' interpretation of
human rights legislation is that it would solve a problem that arises
when the terms of these statutes are explicitly incorporated into a
collective agreement. The problem in such cases is that a reviewing
court is faced with the apparent application of two different standards
of review to the interpretation of a single normative text, and has no
principled way to decide which standard to apply.
81 Supra note 48.
82 Ibid at paras 72-74 (questions of general law are often intertwined with labour
law issues, and adjudicators should be accorded deference when these ques-
tions are connected to their core area of expertise). See also Nor-Man, supra
note 8 at paras 32-34, 38 (arbitral awards that give common law or equitable
remedies should not, for that reason alone, be subject to review on a standard of
correctness).
83 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 128. Binnie J also stated that "[1]abour arbitra-
tors, as in this case, command deference on legal matters within their enabling
statute or on legal matters intimately connected thereto." Ibid at para 147.
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There are many reasons why unions and employers choose to
explicitly incorporate human rights language into their collective
agreements. Before Parry Sound, this strategy provided an assurance
that an arbitrator would have jurisdiction over human rights claims
originating in the workplace. Thus the parties to a collective agree-
ment containing such language could be certain that someone who
understood the labour relations context could decide disputes with a
human rights dimension. Furthermore, since an arbitral interpretation
of the terms of a collective agreement is deferred to by the courts, the
parties to a collective agreement containing human rights language
had some assurance that an eventual decision would be final and
binding, rather than get bogged down in judicial review proceedings.
However, in such cases the jurisprudence gives no clear answer
as to how courts should approach the judicial review of an arbitral
decision on the human rights language in question. Since that lan-
guage is in the collective agreement, an arbitral interpretation of it
would normally command deference. On the other hand, if the lan-
guage was not put into the collective agreement, the arbitrator would
still be obliged to interpret it because it was part of the human rights
statute - but an arbitral interpretation of a human rights statute is
usually reviewed on the correctness standard, since those statutes are
of central importance to the legal system as a whole.
The Supreme Court has been confronted twice with collective
agreements that incorporate language from human rights statutes, but
has failed to settle the matter.8 4 In Green Bay, Justice Major, for the
majority of the Court, asserted that two standards of review applied:
In the present appeal, both the "patently unreasonable" and the "correct-
ness" standards of review are involved. The Board interpreted the collective
agreement and the [Human Rights] Code. If the Board was incorrect but not
patently unreasonable in all of its findings, the Court can only interfere on the
"correctness" standard with those portions of the decision that as questions of
law interpret the Code.8
84 See Commission scolaire regionale de Chambly v Bergevin, [1994] 2 SCR
525, 115 DLR (4th) 609; Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v
Newfoundland (Green Bay Health Care Centre), [1996] 2 SCR 3, 134 DLR (4th)
1 [Green Bay].
85 Green Bay, ibid at para 14. Given the demise of the patently unreasonableness
standard in Dunsmuir, the effect of this statement now would result in the appli-
cation of the reasonableness standard.
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Here, Justice Major begged the question, as he did not directly
address what would happen if the collective agreement used exactly
the same language as the human rights statute.8 6 If, as I suggest, the
standard of review were to be the same in each case, the problem
would disappear. Having the same standard of review would also be
in keeping with the objective of having a single standard applicable to
the whole decision, rather than applying different standards to differ-
ent aspects of it.17
Parry Sound did not resolve this problem; if anything, it exacer-
bated it. In that case, the Court held that "the substantive rights and
obligations of the Human Rights Code are incorporated into each col-
lective agreement over which an arbitrator has jurisdiction."" Thus,
where the parties have explicitly included human rights language in
the collective agreement, the arbitrator's interpretation would be sub-
ject to review on the reasonableness standard, but where statutory
human rights protections are merely "incorporated" into the agree-
ment, the applicable standard of review would still be correctness.89
(d) Acquiring Expertise
If courts are to show deference to arbitrators' interpretation of
human rights legislation, it must be in recognition of arbitral expertise.
Since the case law to date has not recognized arbitrators as experts in
human rights, courts could not show such deference without acknow-
ledging that an arbitrator has acquired the necessary expertise.
Justice lacobucci was right in Parry Sound when he said that
arbitrators could acquire expertise in human rights matters. It appears
86 In Green Bay, ibid, the parties had included language prohibiting discrimina-
tion, but had not provided for the "bona fide occupational requirement" defence
against prima facie discrimination. At issue was whether the arbitrator was right
in allowing the employer to raise that defence.
87 Rogers Communications, supra note 43 at paras 78-87.
88 Supra note 1 at paras 23, 55.
89 The adjective "substantive" implies that it is the "rights and obligations," not the
language of the Code, that are ultimately "incorporated" into collective agree-
ments. If that is the case, an arbitrator's interpretation of these rights and obliga-
tions cannot be understood to be synonymous with interpretation of the language
of the agreement.
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that they do in fact acquire it. A cursory perusal of any Canadian
arbitration reporter reveals that claims with a human rights compon-
ent have for some years accounted for a significant proportion of
arbitration awards. In other words, arbitrators have "grapple[d] with
[these] issues on a repeated basis."9 0 This fact could well serve as
the basis for a reappraisal of arbitral expertise, in which the courts
would establish that, to use Justice Binnie's formulation in Dunsmuir,
human rights statutes are "closely related" or "intimately connected"
to arbitrators' enabling statutes.
Framing the question solely in terms of the arbitrator's enabling
statute is somewhat misleading, since arbitral jurisdiction is generally
based at least in part on a collective agreement.9' However, it is pre-
cisely the quasi-consensual nature of arbitration that could serve to
ground a judicial reappraisal of the idea of acquired expertise in light
of developments since Parry Sound.
Recall that judicial determination of expertise is not an empirical
question, but a legal one. Judges examine an administrative tribunal's
enabling legislation in order to determine what role the legislator has
reserved for them, and to what extent that role is specialized. There is
no reason that this cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to collective
agreements. Thus, the very fact that the parties have chosen to submit
a human rights question to a given arbitrator could be taken as an
indicator that they perceive that arbitrator to be an expert. Taking the
matter a step further, parties could include a clause in their collective
agreement stipulating that they recognize the expertise of arbitrators
in resolving grievances based on human rights legislation.
It might at first appear odd that judges should defer to private
parties' determination of expertise. But this is in effect what judges do
when they recognize arbitrators' expertise in interpreting collective
agreements. Unlike other administrative tribunals, arbitrators have no
legislated appointment procedure; other than mutual acceptability by
the signatories to the collective agreement, there are no prerequisites
90 Supra note 1 at para 53.
91 In Quebec, the enabling statute is the Quebec Labour Code, supra note 51. In
other Canadian jurisdictions, arbitrators derive their authority from a clause in
the collective agreement, or from legislation in the absence of such a clause. See
e.g. Canada Labour Code, supra note 51, s 57; Ontario Labour Relations Act,
supra note 51, s 48.
374 CDN. LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL
for being an arbitrator.9 2 In effect, judges must defer both to the
legislatures (who have determined that arbitrators are to benefit both
from a wide grant of jurisdiction and from a privative clause) and
to the parties to the collective agreement (who have appointed the
arbitrator, and by doing so, have invested him or her with presumed
expertise). Given that the parties' power to choose an arbitrator is
granted to them by statute, there is clear legislative intent to let them
determine the issue of expertise. The courts should therefore defer to
the parties' choice.
4. OBJECTIONS TO APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS
STANDARD TO ARBITRAL DECISIONS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUES
Giving deference to arbitral interpretations of human rights
legislation is open to several objections. Here, I address the three
objections that I take to be the most serious.
(a) The "Rule of Law" Objection
The first objection is that human rights statutes are so funda-
mental to our conception of a just society that we cannot countenance
their incorrect interpretation and application by an administrative
tribunal. Deference requires that a reasonable but (in a judge's opin-
ion) wrong interpretation must stand. Would this not violate the rule
of law?
One answer to this objection is that it is misleading to character-
ize as wrong a reasonable interpretation with which a court disagrees.
A judge is simply not as well-placed as an arbitrator to determine the
"correct" application of a human rights statute in the employment
context; this is the whole point of deferring to expertise. In his con-
curring opinion in Dunsmuir, Justice Binnie made the point clearly:
92 Arbitrators appointed by a labour minister in the absence of agreement by the
parties do have to meet certain prerequisites. See e.g Quebec Labour Code,
supra note 51, art 77; An Act Respecting the Conseil Consultatif du Travail et
de la Main-d'oeuvre, RSQ c C-55; Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra note 51,
s49(10).
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It is sometimes said by judges that an administrator acting within his or her
discretion "has the right to be wrong." This reflects an unduly court-centred
view of the universe. A disagreement between the court and an administrator
does not necessarily mean that the administrator is wrong.93
To assert that applying the reasonableness standard to arbitral
interpretations of human rights statutes would result in insulating
"incorrect" decisions from review is to misunderstand the founda-
tions of deference.
Another response to the "rule of law" objection is that even if
deference were accorded to arbitrators on judicial review, this would
not allow them to render decisions that were in breach of human
rights legislation. After all, deference to an administrative tribunal's
reasoning does not require courts to abdicate their role in controlling
the legality of the tribunal's orders. Judicial oversight of administra-
tive action can be maintained even when courts defer to a tribunal's
reasoning.9 4 It should be noted that private (non-labour) arbitration,
including the private arbitration of employment contract disputes of
non-unionized workers, is subject to judicial control in the same lim-
ited way. In Quebec, for instance, the Code of Civil Procedure does
not allow judges to review the reasoning of consensual arbitration
awards on any standard, let alone correctness. A judge can only refuse
to certify an award if the award itself is contrary to public order.95
93 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 125.
94 This is complicated by Dore v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12 at paras 57-58,
[2012] 1 SCR 395, which held that a primafacie violation of a Charter-protected
right caused by the exercise of statutory discretion by an administrative body
should be reviewed on administrative law principles rather than on the test for
justification of the violation under section 1 of the Charter as set out in R v Oakes,
[1986] 1 SCR 103. Whether a given exercise of discretion violates the Charter
will thus be determined with reference to the reasonableness of the administra-
tive body's decision. Furthermore, the Court has taken an expansive view of the
concept of "discretion," to the point where any process of statutory interpretation
that implies a choice among a range of reasonable meanings could be seen as
an exercise of discretion. Until the Court clarifies this situation (either by stat-
ing that administrative tribunals deserve deference even when they interpret the
Charter, or by revising its conception of discretion), there will be considerable
uncertainty and room for incoherence. On this last point, see Evan Fox-Decent
& Alexander Pless, "The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization or
Inconstancy?" in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in
Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) 407 at 445.
95 CCP, supra note 21, art 946.5.
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(b) The "Arbitrators Aren't Lawyers" Objection
A second objection to recognizing arbitrators' expertise in human
rights matters is grounded in the fact that not all arbitrators have legal
training. How can we defer to the supposed expertise in statutory inter-
pretation of someone who has no formal training in the law?
This objection misunderstands my argument. If we accept that
the parties' choice of an arbitrator is an appropriate indicator of
expertise, we ought not to peruse the arbitrator's curriculum vitae in
search of further evidence. When lawyers appear before a Superior
Court judge, they cannot question her expertise in, say, criminal law
simply because she practised exclusively in, for instance, commercial
law before being called to the bench. Formally, the guarantor of com-
petence is the appointment process itself.
Furthermore, if the "arbitrators aren't lawyers" objection holds,
then it also holds for their interpretation of other legislation, includ-
ing labour relations statutes. Yet deference to arbitral interpretation
of these statutes is well established. If the argument is that human
rights statutes are somehow special and can never be properly left to
non-lawyers to interpret, then the objection is really just a variant of
the rule of law objection addressed above.
Admittedly, my argument entails the notion that if - for what-
ever reason - parties choose non-lawyers as their arbitrators in
human rights claims, that choice should be respected and the resulting
decision should be insulated from judicial review. Nevertheless, we
have every reason to believe that parties are likely to favour legally
trained arbitrators for grievances that involve complex questions of
law. Certainly there is no dearth of lawyers turned arbitrators.96
(c) The "Individual Rights" Objection
The final objection that I want to consider is the view that
since unions (rather than individual grievors) control the arbitration
process, it is illegitimate to insulate decisions that affect what are
96 For example, the Quebec Ministry of Labour's 2011 list of arbitrators includes
90 individuals, of whom 77 have an undergraduate law degree. More than a quar-
ter of those on the list have a graduate degree. See Comit6 consultatif du travail
et de la main-d'oeuvre, Liste annotee d'arbitres de griefs, online: <http://www.
conference-des-arbitres.qc.ca/ArbitratorListAnnotated.aspx>.
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fundamental individual rights from judicial review for correctness.9 7
On this view, unionized employees would be a kind of second-class
citizen when it came to the adjudication of their human rights.
My reply to this "individual rights" objection is that it simply
has nothing to do with the standard of review of arbitration decisions.
Rather, it is an objection to the jurisdiction of arbitrators to interpret
and apply human rights statutes. The current state of the law is such
that a unionized employee who does not want to have her employ-
ment-related human rights complaint dealt with in arbitration may
often take that complaint to the human rights forum, as long as it is
not also pursued in arbitration.98 The argument for deference to arbi-
trators does not in any way suggest that they ought to have exclusive
jurisdiction over human rights claims, but merely that once they exer-
cise their concurrent jurisdiction, their awards should be reviewable
only on a reasonableness standard.
If the "individual rights" objection had any merit, it would also
hold for the adjudication of all kinds of other, non-human-rights claims
that unionized employees might wish to bring - and it clearly does
not hold for other kinds of claims. In those cases, the arbitrator's juris-
diction really is exclusive, and an arbitral award will be shown a high
level of deference by the courts. Insofar as this objection is particular to
human rights claims, it is just a version of the "rule of law" objection.
5. CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that labour arbitrators are now sufficiently expert
in the interpretation of human rights legislation that they should be
accorded deference in this area by reviewing judges. How judges
97 The possibility that unions might use their control of grievances to insulate dis-
criminatory clauses of a collective agreement from oversight was an important
reason for recognizing the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals over the collect-
ive agreement negotiation process. Morin, supra note 57 at para 28.
98 This is a consequence of Morin, ibid. Since that decision, courts have routinely
found that unionized employees may contest the application of a discrimina-
tory clause in their collective agreement before human rights tribunals. See e.g.
Syndicat du transport de Montreal - CSN c Commission des droits de lapersonne
et des droits de lajeunesse, 2010 QCCA 165, 69 CHRR D/444. This has also led
to successful human rights claims by unionized employees in the ordinary courts,
at least in Quebec. See Montreal (Ville de) c Audige, 2013 QCCA 171.
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could apprehend this evolution in expertise in the context of deter-
mining the applicable standard of review is not entirely clear.
In Dunsmuir, Justice Binnie stated that "[j]udicial review is an idea
that has lately become unduly burdened with law office metaphysics."99
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's attempt in that case to simplify mat-
ters by substituting a "deference" approach for the "pragmatic and func-
tional" approach has done little to bring the law down to earth. This is
true of the determination of tribunal expertise as well as the role of such
expertise in the courts' selection of the appropriate standard of review.
The distinction between the expertise of individual adjudicators
and the institutional expertise of tribunals is helpful in understanding
the nature of expertise, and so is the distinction between a tribunal's
expertise and its specialized role. However, the courts are likely to
use these distinctions only obliquely, since determination of expertise
is ultimately not a matter of fact but of (legal) fiction.
Keeping this in mind, we are not without tools to apprehend
evolving expertise. First, legislators could explicitly set out what they
see as the level of expertise of a tribunal in its enabling statute, as
the British Columbia Administrative Tribunals Act does, although it
remains to be seen whether dictating the resulting standard of review
would pass section 96 muster on a direct challenge.100 Second, courts
could take judicial notice of acquired expertise by adjusting the range
of statutes that are "closely related" or "intimately connected" to a
given tribunal's enabling act. Finally, in the particular case of labour
arbitration, the role that the parties to a collective agreement play in
selecting an adjudicator and determining her jurisdiction allows them
to signal to the courts, explicitly or implicitly, the matters in which
they understand the arbitrator to be an expert.
99 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 122.
100 See Crevier, supra note 39. Figliola, supra note 29 and Moore, supra note
29 are not determinative of this issue. On the one hand, the Supreme Court's
application of the B.C. ATA, supra note 29, ss 58-59, could be seen as an
endorsement of its constitutionality. On the other hand, the absence of any real
standard of review analysis may signal the Court's unwillingness to consider
the relationship between the ATA and the general law of judicial review until
the question is squarely raised. The Court also skirted the question in Rio Tinto
Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 SCR 650,
deciding that a mixed question of law and fact falls between the two standards
provided for by the ATA (correctness and patent unreasonableness) and that, in
such cases, the reasonableness standard set out in Dunsmuir, ibid, applies.
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